adverse selection

Many States with COVID-19 Special Enrollment Periods See Increase in Younger Enrollees

Posted January 29, 2021 by CHIR Faculty

President Joe Biden directed his administration to reopen the federal health insurance marketplace, an action the Trump administration refused to take last year after the COVID-19 pandemic struck due to adverse selection concerns. In a new post for the Commonwealth Fund, CHIR experts discuss how states that created a broad special enrollment period (SEP) for the uninsured in response to the pandemic – and broadcast the opportunity through outreach efforts – saw an increase in younger enrollees, seemingly contradicting claims that reducing SEP barriers inevitably leads to adverse selection.

Stakeholders Respond to the Proposed Health Reimbursement Arrangement Rule. Part I: State Insurance Departments and Marketplaces

Posted February 15, 2019 by Rachel Schwab

In October 2018, the Trump administration proposed rules to expand the use of health reimbursement arrangements (HRAs) by loosening current federal limitations. The administration’s proposal would allow employers to offer employees the tax-advantaged accounts to assist with health care expenses, including premiums, in lieu of employer-sponsored coverage. To understand the potential impact of the proposals, CHIR reviewed comments from various stakeholder groups. For the first blog in our series, Rachel Schwab summarizes comments from state marketplaces and state insurance departments.

What About “Don’t Discriminate Against Sick People” Do You Not Understand?

Posted December 14, 2015 by

Although it’s a complicated law, there’s one thing about the ACA that’s not at all complicated: the requirement that insurers stop discriminating against sick people. Yet some insurance companies still appear confused by this rule. Sabrina Corlette looks at recent insurer attempts to discourage sicker, older people from enrolling in their plans – and the efforts of at least one state to combat them.

New Report Evaluates States’ Strategies to Stabilize Health Insurance Premiums and Build Sustainable Exchanges

Posted November 19, 2013 by CHIR Faculty

The Affordable Care Act includes a range of health insurance reforms that will lead to health care costs being shared more evenly between the healthy and the sick. Some experts have pointed to concerns that in the short term, there will be premium “rate shock” for some individuals, while in the long term, exchanges will be vulnerable to adverse selection if they attract a disproportionate number of older, sicker enrollees. Under the ACA, states have considerable flexibility to implement additional strategies to manage their markets and protect consumers. In collaboration with researchers at the Urban Institute, CHIR faculty members Sabrina Corlette and Sarah Dash examine states’ strategies to make premiums more affordable and protect the exchanges from potential adverse selection.